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We explore in this paper the performance of sales rebate contracts in fashion supply chains. We
conduct both analytical and numerical analyses via a mean-variance framework with reference
to real empirical data. To be specific, we evaluate the expected profits and variance of profits
risk of the fashion supply chains, fashion retailers, and manufacturers under 1 the currently
implemented sales rebate practices, 2 the case without sales rebate, and 3 the theoretical
coordination situation if target sales rebate is adopted. In addition, we analyze how sales eﬀort
aﬀects the performances of the supply chain and its agents. Our analysis indicates that the
rebate contracts may hurt the retailer and the manufacturer of a fashion supply chain when it
is inappropriately set. Moreover, a properly designed sales rebate contract not only can coordinate
the supply chain with retail sales eﬀort but can also improve expected profits and lower the levels
of risk for both the manufacturer and the retailer.
1. Introduction
Varying consumer tastes, trends, technology and shorter product life cycle resulted in
a turbulent market for fashion products Frings 1. Given the product and market
characteristics, demand for fashion products is diﬃcult to forecast regardless of whether
it is on item level or aggregate level Christopher et al. 2. The above-mentioned nature
of the fashion industry indicates eﬀective supply chain management becomes increasingly
strategically important for supply chain entities, especially in terms of coordination Wensley
3. The fashion company and its supply chain partners strive hard to coordinate their
internal and external activities so as to achieve the goal of delivering the product to the right
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place at the right time in the right shape in an eﬃcient and eﬀective manner Fernie 4.
Supply chain coordination SCC is an important criterion for measuring the performance
of supply chains Anupindi and Bassok 5. A coordinated supply chain is one in which
the profitability of the entire supply chain is maximized Taylor 6. If there exist multiple
decision makers agents in the supply chain, a lack of coordination usually occurs as
the agents tend to have diﬀerent incentives and objectives, and the presence of double
marginalization Spengler 7, generally describes the situation that each firm only considers
its own profit margin in making its decision but does not consider the supply chain’s profit.
In order to achieve SCC, supply chain contracts are commonly employed as a
mechanism that provides incentives to channel agents to behave in a way which can optimize
the supply chain i.e., coordinate supply chain Wang 8. Some popular supply chain
contracts commonly observed include returns contracts Pasternack 9, revenue sharing
contracts Yao et al. 10, quantity flexibility contracts Barnes-Schuster et al. 11, quantity
discount contracts Wang et al. 12, markdown money contract Ning et al. 13 and Shen
et al. 14, and rebate contracts Aydin and Porteus 15, Taylor 6, Arcelus and Srinivasan
16, Chiu et al. 17, and Chiu et al. 18. There are two kinds of rebate, namely, the consumer
rebate and the sales rebate. Consumer rebate is a kind of payments from manufacturer to
consumer upon consumer’s purchases of manufacturer’s product Aydin and Porteus 15.
Sales rebate is also called “channel rebate” Chiu et al. 18 and Kurata and Yue 19 and it
is a payment from the manufacturer to the retailer based on the items sold from the retailer
to the end consumers. This paper focuses on the latter one, that is, the sales rebate.
It is commonly known that the amount of sales rebate that can be granted heavily
depends on the retailer’s performance and the magnitude of salespush the manufacturer
wants to achieve. Notice that when sales rebate is exercised based on actual sales performance
measured by retail scanner POS data with using online technology, it is called “scanback
rebate” Arcelus and Srinivasan 16 and Kurata and Yue 19. In fashion companies, it is
also known as “push money” or “push price promotions” Aydin and Porteus 15. Linear
and target sales rebates are two common types of sales rebate. The former one is a kind of
rebate in which manufacturer pays retailer a fixed rebate for each unit sold irrespective of
quantity sold Taylor 6. The latter one, the target sales rebate, is a kind of rebate which is
paid for each unit sold beyond a prespecified target sales level. The amount of rebate is hence
a function of the retailer’s specific sales performance with respect to the sales volume levels
Zhang et al. 20. As a remark, as reported in Taylor 6, the linear rebate contract fails to
achieve SCC but conversely a properly designed target sales rebate alone can achieve SCC
and a win-win outcome under a quantity decision only model. When demand is aﬀected by
sales eﬀort, SCC and win-win outcome can be achieved with properly designed target rebate
with returns. Moreover, Taylor 6 ascertains that reducing the retailer’s risk by sales rebate
can strengthen the incentives oﬀered for lifting the retailer’s sales eﬀort since the associated
risk is partially transferred from retailer to manufacturer. For more empirical details of sales
rebates industrial practices, see the cases reported in Chiu et al. 18.
Sales rebate contracts are regarded as a powerful incentive instrument for pushing the
retailer to sell better. Taylor 6 ascertains that there is often a mismatch between quantity
ordered by retailer and consumers’ demand and he analytically proves that sales rebates
can enhance supply chain performance. In order to avoid significant markdown and end-
of-season clearance loss, understocking may be found in many fashion retailers Wang 8.
For instance, matching demand and supply is particularly diﬃcult for fashion brands such
as Nike, the world’s leading athletic footwear and sportswear company, because they have
to deal with many product varieties, for example, sizes and colors Sridharan et al. 21.
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As a result, to encourage the retailer to order and stock more, the manufacturer employs the
sales rebate contracts to enhance the retailer’s incentives to do so. It is also believed that the
retailer will exert more sales eﬀort to sell products and order more from manufacturer in the
presence of sales rebate Taylor 6 and Chiu et al. 17. Moreover, Wang et al. 12 finds
that sales rebate increases the retailer’s eﬀective income per sale. Sales rebate can also help
to achieve supply chain coordination and win-win situation in a decentralized supply chain
system see Taylor 6, Cachon 22, Krishnan et al. 23, and Lu et al. 24.
In this paper, we explore the applications and performance of sales rebate contracts
in fashion supply chains with reference to real company empirical data. With the help
of mathematical models, the performances of the supply chains under the currently
implemented rebate practices the current practices, the case without sales rebate the no
rebate case, and the theoretical coordination situation SCC if target sales rebate is adopted
are explored. After that, we extend the analysis to include saleseﬀort and then explore how
sales eﬀort aﬀects the supply chain performance. In addition, we employ the mean-variance
MV approach to analyze the payoﬀs expected profits and levels of risk variance of
profits of the supply chain and its agents. Notice that the use of MV approach is in line
with the recent supply chain literature see Choi et al. 25–27 for more discussions; for a
complete review and historical development, refer to Choi and Chiu 28. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first which employs real company data to examine sales rebate
contracts from the perspective of supply chain management under the MV framework. Our
analysis interestingly indicates that the rebate contracts may hurt the performances of both
the retailer and the manufacturer of a fashion supply chain when they are inappropriately
set. Moreover, a properly designed sales rebate contract not only can achieve SCC with
sales eﬀort but can also improve expected profits and lower the levels of risk for both
the manufacturer and the retailer. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the analytical models, which include the no sales-eﬀort model and sales-eﬀort
model. Section 3 presents the detailed numerical analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper with
a discussion on managerial insights.
2. Analytical Models
We consider that a fashion supply chain with one manufacturer which can be a fashion
brand and one fashion retailer selling a fashionable product in a newsvendor setting in
which there is only a single selling season with a single ordering and pricing opportunity;
at the end of the selling season, the fashion retailer sells the leftover with a big discount price.
Let p > 0 be the unit retail price, w > 0 the unit wholesale price, c > 0 the unit production
cost, s > 0 the unit net end of season value of the unsold quantity per unit, u > 0 the unit
sales rebate, and T > 0 the target sales level under the target sales rebate contract; T  0 for
the linear rebate contract. In particular, if the target sales rebate policy is adopted, then the
retailer can receive a rebate u from the manufacturer for each unit sold beyond T . We assume
that p, c, and s are exogenous and w, u, and T are endogenous. Moreover, we assume that
p > w > c > s. Under the target sales rebate contracts, the manufacturer specifies w, u and
T to the retailer. In turn, the retailer determines the order quantity q ≥ 0. The fashion retailer
faces an uncertain market demand. Two demand models developed by Taylor 6 and Chiu
et al. 17, namely, the no-sales-eﬀort and the sales-eﬀort models, are basically employed for
the analysis in this paper. For any risk-sensitive supply chain agent, in addition to expected
profit, the level of risk is also considered in making decisions. In this paper, we apply the MV
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approach for investigating the risk-profit tradeoﬀs under the sales rebate contracts. In theMV
approach, the level of risk that a party bears is quantified by the variance of profit. Denoted
by V · the variance of its argument.
2.1. No-Sales-Effort Model
For the no-sales-eﬀort model, the market demand x follows a probability distribution
function fx and a cumulative function Fx. Let F·  1 − F· and denote the expectation
of an argument by E·. Moreover, let R, M, and SC represent the retailer, the manufacturer,
and the supply chain, respectively. For any given q ≥ 0, for the no rebate case under the no-
sales-eﬀort model, the profits of the retailer ΠR,1, the manufacturer ΠM,1, and the supply
chain ΠSC,1 are given as follows:
ΠR,1 
(
p −w)q 
 (p − s)min(x − q, 0),
ΠM,1  w − cq,
ΠSC,1 
(
p − c)q 
 (p − s)min(x − q, 0).
2.1
Taking expectation and variance, we yield the following:
EΠM,1  w − cq,
EΠR,1 
(
p −w)q 
 (p − s)
∫q
0
Fxdx,
EΠSC,1 
(
p − c)q − (p − s)
∫q
0
Fxdx,
V ΠR,1 
(
p − s)2ξ(0, q),
V ΠM,1  0,
V ΠSC,1 
(
p − s)2ξ(0, q),
2.2
where ξy, z  2
∫z
yz − xFxdx − 
∫z
y Fxdx
2 for 0 ≤ y < z. For the target sales rebate
contracts under the no-sales-eﬀort model, the profits of the retailer ΠR,2, the manufacturer
ΠM,2, and the supply chain ΠSC,2 are given by
ΠR,2 
(
p −w)q 
 (p − s)min(x − q, 0) 
 u(q − T 
max(min(x − q, 0), T − q)),
ΠM,2  w − cq 
 u
(
T − q −max(min(x − q, 0), T − q)),
ΠSC,2  ΠSC,1,
2.3
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respectively. The associated expected values and variances for q > T no rebate would be
given for any q ≤ T  are expressed below:
EΠR,2 
(
p −w)q − (p − s)
∫q
0
Fxdx 
 u
∫q
T
Fxdx,
EΠM,2  w − cq − u
∫q
T
Fxdx,
V ΠR,2 
(
p − s)2ξ(0, q) 
 u2ξ(T, q) 
 2u(p − s)ξC
(
T, q
)
,
V ΠM,2  u2ξ
(
T, q
)
,
2.4
where ξCy, z 
∫y
0 Fxdx 
 2
∫z
yz − xFxdx −
∫z
y Fxdx
∫z
y Fxdx, for 0 ≤ y < z.
2.2. Sales-Effort Model
In the no-sales-eﬀort model we proposed above, how sales eﬀort aﬀects the retail demand is
not considered. Now, for the more general sales-eﬀort model, we assume that the market
demand can be increased by exerting sales eﬀort by the retailer. Actions which increase
the sales eﬀort can take various forms. For putting and displaying the products into
the more prominent places in the retail store, asking the sales associates to promote the
products more often e.g., during checkout or when the customers enter the store, preparing
advertisement/promotion leaflet and banner are all popular measures for increasing “sales
eﬀort.” We consider the case where the retailer is wholly responsible for the cost of the sales
eﬀort, and the retailer would make the decision on whether or not to exert sales eﬀort.
Obviously, a sales rebate contract provides monetary incentive to lead the retailer to exert
higher sales eﬀort. To be specific, the market demand for the sales-eﬀort model is given by
y  x 
 δ, where δ ≥ 0 is the demand increased when sales eﬀort is exerted by the retailer.
Denoted by e the retailer’s cost for exerting sales eﬀort. We note that y follows the probability
distribution function fy−δ and the cumulative function Fy−δ. Moreover, if the demand
without sales eﬀort has mean μ and standard deviation σ, then by exerting sales eﬀort, the
market demand has mean μ 
 δ and standard deviation σ.
For the no rebate case under the sales-eﬀort model, for any given q ≥ 0, the profits of
the retailer ΠR,3, the manufacturer ΠM,3, and the supply chain ΠSC,3 are given by
ΠR,3 
(
p −w)q 
 (p − s)min(x 
 δ − q, 0) − e,
ΠM,3  w − cq,
ΠSC,3 
(
p − c)q 
 (p − s)min(x 
 δ − q, 0) − e.
2.5
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The associated expected values and variances are
EΠM,3  w − cq,
EΠR,3 
(
p −w)q 
 (p − s)
∫q−δ
0
Fxdx − e,
EΠSC,3 
(
p − c)q − (p − s)
∫q−δ
0
Fxdx − e,
V ΠR,3 
(
p − s)2ξ(0, q − δ),
V ΠM,3  0,
V ΠSC,3 
(
p − s)2ξ(0, q − δ).
2.6
For the case with target sales rebate under the sales-eﬀort model, the profits of the
retailer ΠR,4, the manufacturer ΠM,4, and the supply chain ΠSC,4 can be derived as
follows:
ΠR,4 
(
p −w)q 
 (p − s)min(x 
 δ − q, 0) 
 u(q − T 
max(min(x 
 δ − q, 0), T − q)) − e,
ΠM,4  w − cq 
 u
(
T − q −max(min(x 
 δ − q, 0), T − q)),
ΠSC,4  ΠSC,3.
2.7
The associated expected values and variances for q > T no rebate would be given for any
q ≤ T can be found in the following:
EΠR,4 
(
p −w)q − (p − s)
∫q−δ
0
Fxdx 
 u
∫q−δ
T−δ
Fxdx − e,
EΠM,4  w − cq − u
∫q−δ
T−δ
Fxdx,
V ΠR,4 
(
p − s)2ξ(0, q − δ) 
 u2ξ(T − δ, q − δ) 
 2u(p − s)ξC
(
T − δ, q − δ),
V ΠM,4  u2ξ
(
T − δ, q − δ).
2.8
For i  M,R, SC and j  1, 2, 3, 4, denoted by q∗i,j the optimal order quantity that
maximizes EΠi,j, and let E∗Πi,j be the associated maximum attainable value of EΠi,j,
for example, E∗ΠR,4 is the maximum attainable expected profit of the retailer under target
sales rebate contract in the sales-eﬀort model. We have Lemma 2.1.
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Lemma 2.1. For any given δ > 0 and e > 0, exerting sales eﬀort is preferable to not exerting sales
eﬀort for the supply chain if and only if E∗ΠSC,3 > E∗ΠSC,1, which implies that
(
p − c)q∗SC,3 −
(
p − s)
∫q∗SC,3−δ
0
Fxdx − e > (p − c)q∗SC,1 −
(
p − s)
∫q∗SC,1
0
Fxdx. 2.9
Lemma 2.1 is intuitive and condition 2.9 gives important hint at when exerting sales
eﬀort outperforms the case of not exerting eﬀort. By considering the first- and second-order
optimality conditions, we observe that q∗SC,1 and q
∗
SC,3 are unique and q
∗
SC,1  q
∗
SC,3−δ−F−1p−
c/p − s. Then 2.9 implies that e/δ < p − c. In other words, we have Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2. Exerting sales eﬀort is preferable to not exerting sales eﬀort for the supply chain if and
only if the marginal cost of the sales eﬀort is less than the supply chain’s product profit margin (i.e.,
e/δ < p − c).
Lemma 2.2 gives a very neat analytical result indicating how the product’s profit
margin in the supply chain aﬀects whether exerting sales eﬀort is preferable or not. In
particular, for high profit margin items, exerting sales eﬀort outperforms the case of not
exerting sales eﬀort. In real industrial setting, this i.e., the one with high supply chain profit
margin is applied to the highly fashionable brands as well as the higher-end luxury and
designer fashion labels.
3. Numerical Analysis
3.1. No-Sales-Effort Model: Expected Profit Analysis
Data collected from current practices of the sales rebate contract from five companies the
following fictitious names MRS, MH, RX, SS, and LS are used in this paper to represent the
real companies surveyed. The data sets are contributed by the managers of the respective
companies with our survey conducted in 2009. All these companies have their oﬃces in Hong
Kong and they are well-established fashion companies see Table 1 would be analyzed
amongst three scenarios: SCC For the SCC case, all five companies are assumed to adopt
target sales rebate to achieve SCC. We follow Chiu et al. 17 to obtain the target sales
rebate contract parameters for achieving SCC, the current practices, and the no rebate case,
under the no-sales-eﬀort model. Note that the no rebate case has a zero target level and
a zero rebate. Since demand information is not given from the cases, we assume that the
demand for all cases follows a normal distribution with mean 1000 and standard deviation
300 notice that our own analysis reveals that the specific set of parameters does not aﬀect
our general conclusion and insights. For example, see the appendix for some results with
diﬀerent demand sizes.
Table 2 similar results are observed when we consider diﬀerent demand settings.
Please refer to Table 9 for the expected profits under SCC, the current practices, and the
no rebate case for the no-sales-eﬀort model. Tables 10, 11, and 12 show the comparisons
among SCC, the current practices, and the no rebate case summarizes the expected profits
under SCC, the current practices, and the no rebate case for the no-sales-eﬀort model. Table 2
shows that, for the current practices, among the five supply chains under exploration, some
manufacturers and some retailers have less expected profits compared to the no rebate case.
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Table 1: Summary of current sales rebate practices∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Business types Sportswear Children wear Luxurywatches Cosmetic Jeanswear
Rebate forms Target Target Linear Target Linear
Rebate rates
% of p per unit 1.5% 3% 15% 10% 2%
T
2% of expected
demand
5% of expected
demand 0%
10% of expected
demand 0%
c 120 15 9000 50 66
w 218 35 16000 100 195
s 58 7.25 4350 24.2 32
S 499 80 37600 190 390
∗Notice that RX and LS are implementing linear rebate contracts with a zero target level. MRS, MH, and SS are implementing
target sales rebate.
Table 2: Expected profits under SCC, current practices, and no rebate case for the no-sales-eﬀort model.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
SCC
ER’s profit 232350.15 36930.36 17970881.83 70889.52 154416.22
EM’s profit 117118.79 24059.38 8410536.48 57216.39 151394.49
ESC’s profit 349468.94 60989.74 26381418.30 128105.91 305810.71
Order quantity 1323.30 1373.56 1324.30 1303.59 1392.78
u 697.06 187.74 50053.76 320.97 1354.69
u% of p 139.69% 234.68% 133.12% 168.93% 347.36%
T 1066.53 1049.81 1068.86 1052.17 1036.62
No rebate
ER’s profit 231372.28 36680.45 17903826.88 70266.49 152409.02
EM’s profit 108318.02 21810.15 7807041.98 51609.09 133329.75
ESC’s profit 339690.30 58490.60 25710868.86 121875.58 285738.77
Order quantity 1105.29 1090.51 1115.29 1032.18 1033.56
Current practices
ER’s profit 231645.43 36724.47 23186337.56 69889.61 159413.89
EM’s profit 108514.33 21954.56 2785164.79 53639.01 127261.25
ESC’s profit 340159.76 58679.03 25971502.34 123528.62 286675.13
Order quantity 1110.14 1100.14 1157.70 1068.05 1040.92
u 7.49 2.4 5640 19 7.8
T 1020 1050 0 1100 0
On the other hand, under SCC, all manufacturers, all retailers, and all supply chains have
higher expected profits compared to the no rebate case. It implies that sales rebate contracts
could be a trap for the retailer and/or the manufacturer if the sales rebate contract is not well
designed just like in many of the current practices.
For MRS, MS, and SS, among the three scenarios, namely, SCC, the current practices,
and the no rebate case, SCC is the most preferable for all parties because the largest expected
Mathematical Problems in Engineering 9
Table 3: Expected profits under SCC, current practices, and no rebate case for sales-eﬀort model.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
SCC
ER’s profit 232487.15 36975.36 17974681.83 70959.52 154588.22
EM’s profit 118351.79 24464.38 8444736.48 57846.39 152942.49
ESC’s profit 350838.94 61439.74 26419418.30 128805.91 307530.71
Order quantity 1353.30 1403.56 1354.30 1333.59 1422.78
u 697.06 187.74 50053.76 320.97 1354.69
u% of p 139.69% 234.68% 133.12% 168.93% 347.36%
T 1089.23 1077.02 1088.33 1074.88 1062.42
No rebate
ER’s profit 229802.28 36530.45 17731826.88 69466.49 150259.02
EM’s profit 111258.02 22410.15 8017041.98 53109.09 137199.75
ESC’s profit 341060.30 58940.60 25748868.86 122575.58 287458.77
Order quantity 1135.29 1120.51 1145.29 1062.18 1063.56
Current practices
ER’s profit 230186.22 36607.12 23183476.66 69311.06 157497.80
EM’s profit 111343.54 22521.91 2826025.68 54917.56 130897.33
ESC’s profit 341529.76 59129.03 26009502.34 124228.62 288395.13
Order quantity 1140.14 1130.14 1187.70 1098.05 1070.92
u 7.49 2.40 5640 19 7.80
T 1020 1050 0 1100 0
Diﬀerence between the sales-eﬀort model and the no-sales-eﬀort model
sales-eﬀort model minus no-sales-eﬀort model
SCC
ER’s profit 127.85 45 3800 70 172
EM’s profit 1233 405 34200 630 1548
ESC’s profit 1370 450 38000 700 1720
T 22.7 27.21 19.47 22.71 25.8
No rebate
ER’s profit −1570 −150 −172000 −800 −2150
EM’s profit 2940 600 210000 1500 3870
ESC’s profit 1370 450 38000 700 1720
Current practices
ER’s profit −1459.21 −117.35 −2860.9 −578.55 −1916.09
EM’s profit 2829.21 567.35 40860.89 1278.55 3636.08
ESC’s profit 1370 450 38000 700 1720
profits are obtained. This is also called the “win-win situation” because both the retailers
and the manufacturers are better oﬀ. However, for RX and LS, the retailers prefer the
current practices to SCC but the supply chains and the manufacturers prefer SCC to current
practices i.e., not win-win. The current linear rebate practices somehow reduce the retailers’
willingness to move from the current practices towards SCC because SCC could not bring the
expected profits to be as high as the current linear rebate practices to the retailers. The above
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Table 4: Optimal policies of the manufacturers, the retailers, and the supply chain.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Retailer
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
Current practice
and no sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
Current practice
and no sales
eﬀort
Manufacturer
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
Supply chain
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
SCC and
exerting sales
eﬀort
Table 5: Summary of SDP in no-sales-eﬀort model.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
SCC
R 340041.38 92729.12 24867637.01 144908.18 655581.16
M 91952.91 2864.05 6584910.07 43356.19 218807.93
No rebate
R 91862.74 14817.15 7028698.44 30576.09 66276.40
M 0 0 0 0 0
Current practices
R 93346.54 15180.48 11926525.62 31893.56 74040.80
M 318.77 57.65 1270359.79 280.48 1472.62
result reveals the importance of selecting a right form and well-designed rebate policy for
attaining win-win situation for individual agents as well as optimizing the fashion supply
chain. Notice from Table 2 that a big u is needed in order to achieve SCC. Intuitively, as the
manufacturer needs to pay more to the retailer as a rebate with a bigger u, it is very natural
for the manufacturer to avoid oﬀering a big u to the retailer. However, the results in Table
2 show that a big u can indeed benefit the manufacturer because of a much higher retailer’s
order quantity. Therefore, by setting the contract parameters properly, the manufacturer can
gain more expected profit, even with a big u.
3.2. Sales-Effort Model: Expected Profit Analysis
For the sales eﬀort case, since quantifiable data on “sales eﬀort” is impossible to be collected
from the industry, we employ an artificial while reasonable set of values for it. To be specific,
we assume that the demand distribution will still be normal with the mean  1000 
 δ, and
standard deviation  300, where δ  30, which is the eﬀect brought by the sale eﬀort. With
this set of supplementary data, we conduct numerical analysis and the result is summarized
in Table 3.
From Table 3, we can see that the increases in order quantities are obvious by exerting
sales eﬀort, because the retailers order more to accommodate the increases of demand upon
increases of sales eﬀort. Table 3 Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the comparison among SCC,
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Table 6: Summary of SDP in sales-eﬀort model.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
SCC
R 308943.95 89400.20 22324003.38 137745.13 639412.09
M 82900.33 27550.43 5861303.22 40964.35 212875.05
No rebate
R 82379.73 13452.38 6304370.74 28170.95 60614.31
M 0 0 0 0 0
Current practices
R 84229.52 13909.44 11834794.74 29949.46 69758.43
M 421.32 91.51 1270618.52 1.03 1473.03
Table 7: Summary of the expected profits and the profit variances of RX and LS.
Companies
RX LS
Models
No-sales-eﬀort Sales-eﬀort No-sales-eﬀort Sales-eﬀort
SCC
R Eprofit 17970881.83 17981681.83 154416.22 152409.02
s.d. 24867637.01 22324003.38 655581.16 639412.09
M Eprofit 8410536.48 8507736.48 151394.49 156121.69
s.d. 6584910.07 5861303.22 218807.93 212875.05
No-rebate
R Eprofit 17903826.88 17801826.88 152409.02 151259.02
s.d. 7028698.44 6304370.74 66276.40 60614.31
M Eprofit 7807041.98 8017041.98 133329.75 137199.75
s.d. 0 0 0 0
Current practices
R Eprofit 23186337.56 23253476.66 159413.89 158497.80
s.d. 11926525.62 11834794.74 74040.80 69758.43
M Eprofit 2785164.79 2826025.68 127261.25 130897.33
s.d. 1270359.79 1270618.52 1472.62 1473.03
current practices, and the no rebate case also shows that, for the current practices scenario,
some manufacturers and some retailers have lower expected profits compared to the no
rebate case. On the other hand, for the scenario under SCC, all manufacturers, retailers,
and supply chains have higher expected profits compared to the no rebate case. It further
ascertains that sales rebate contracts, for both the no-sales-eﬀort and sales-eﬀort models,
could be a trap for the retailer and/or the manufacturer if the contract is not well designed.
Moreover, Table 3 shows that manufacturers’ and supply chains’ expected profits under the
sales-eﬀort model are always for SCC, the current practices, and the no rebate case bigger
than those of under the no-sales-eﬀort model. However, retailers’ expected profits under the
sales-eﬀort model are smaller than the respective cases of the no-sales-eﬀort model under
“the SCC and the no rebate” scenarios only. Therefore, the retailers would prefer not to exert
sales eﬀort under the current practices. For the retailer, sales eﬀort should be employed only
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Table 8: Summary of the expected profits and the profit variances of MRS, MH and SS.
Companies
MRS MH SS
Models
No-sales-eﬀort Sales-eﬀort No-sales-eﬀort Sales-eﬀort No-sales-eﬀort Sales-eﬀort
SCC
R Eprofit 232350.15 232487.15 36930.36 36975.36 71009.45 71129.45
s.d. 340041.38 308943.95 92729.12 89400.20 144908.18 137745.13
M Eprofit 117118.79 118351.79 24059.38 24464.38 57371.71 58451.71
s.d. 91952.91 82900.33 28645.05 27550.43 43356.19 40964.35
No-rebate
R Eprofit 231372.28 229802.28 36680.45 36530.45 70380.68 70080.68
s.d. 91862.74 82379.73 14817.15 13452.38 30576.09 28170.95
M Eprofit 108318.02 111258.02 21810.15 22410.15 51712.78 53212.78
s.d. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current practices
R Eprofit 231645.43 230186.22 36724.47 36607.12 70020.76 69942.21
s.d. 93346.54 84229.52 15180.48 13909.44 31893.56 29949.46
M Eprofit 108514.33 111343.54 21954.56 22521.91 53726.10 55004.66
s.d. 318.77 421.32 57.65 91.51 280.48 1.03
when the extra revenue gained from exerting sales eﬀort is more than the cost of exerting it
because the retailer bears wholly the sales eﬀort cost, whereas the manufacturer does not
bear the sales eﬀort cost. As the retailer would order more from the manufacturer when
sales eﬀort is exerted to increase the demand, the manufacturer always enjoys a higher
expected profit from a higher order quantity. Therefore, the manufacturer always welcomes
the retailer to exert sales eﬀort. The above argument further reveals that if the manufacturer
would like to increase the retailer’s order quantity, it is also important to understand how
to motivate the retailer to exert sales eﬀort. It is in fact challenging for the manufacturer
to optimally set the sales rebate contract for stimulating the retailer to exert sales eﬀort.
Table 4 shows that, for MRS, MS, and SS, the retailers prefer the SCC scenario with exerting
sales eﬀort, which is consistent with the optimal goals of the manufacturers and the supply
chains. However, for RX and LS, the retailers would prefer the current practices the linear
rebate contracts for these two companieswithout exerting sales eﬀort but the manufacturers
and the supply chains would prefer the SCC case with sales eﬀort the target sales rebate
contracts. Therefore, there is a diﬀerence between the retailers, the manufacturers, and the
supply chains. The above result proposes that the current linear rebate practices may not
only reduce the retailers’ willingness to move from the current practices towards SCC, they
also prevent the retailers from exerting sales eﬀort. Moreover, the above result shows that
the retailers sometimes may obtain higher expected profits from the current practices and
prefer not to exert sales eﬀort. As a consequence, the SCC scenario and exerting sales eﬀort
would become unattractive for the retailers. The above result again shows the importance
of selecting a right form and well-designed rebate contract for attaining win-win situation
and expected profit maximization of the supply chain. In particular, the setting of sales rebate
contracts could motivate retailers to exert sales eﬀort.
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Table 10: Summary of improvement on profits from no-rebate case to SCC in no-sales-eﬀort model∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Improvement percentage of R profit 0.42 0.68 0.37 0.89 1.32
Improvement percentage of S profit 8.12 10.31 7.73 10.86 13.55
Improvement opercentage of SC profit 2.88 4.27 2.61 5.11 7.02
Improvement percentage of q 19.72 25.96 18.74 26.29 34.75
∗Each company has the same improvement percentage of R, S, and SC profits and q with small, medium, and large demand.
Table 11: Summary of improvement on profits from no-rebate-case to current practice in no-sales-eﬀort
model∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Improvement percentage of R profit 0.12 0.12 29.5 −0.54 4.6
Improvement percentage of S profit 0.18 0.66 −64.32 3.93 −4.55
Improvement opercentage of SC profit 0.14 0.32 1.01 1.36 0.33
Improvement percentage of q 0.44 0.88 3.8 3.47 0.71
∗Each company has the same improvement percentage of R, S, and SC profits and q with small, medium, and large demand.
Table 12: Summary of improvement on profits from current practice to SCC in no-sales-eﬀort model∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Improvement percentage of R profit 0.3 0.56 −22.49 1.43 −3.14
Improvement percentage of S profit 7.93 9.59 201.98 6.67 18.96
Improvement opercentage of SC profit 2.74 3.94 1.58 3.71 6.68
Improvement percentage of q 19.2 24.85 14.39 22.05 33.8
∗Each company has the same improvement percentage of R, S, and SC profits and q with small, medium, and large demand.
Table 13: Summary of improvement on profits from no-rebate-case to SCC in sales-eﬀort model∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Improvement percentage of R profit 0.48 0.8 0.4 0.99 1.43
Improvement percentage of S profit 9.26 12.17 8.17 12.09 14.71
Improvement opercentage of SC profit 3.28 5.04 2.76 5.69 7.63
Improvement percentage of q 22.44 28.71 21.43 29.2 37.66
∗Each company has the same improvement percentage of R, S, and SC profits and q with small, medium, and large demand.
Table 14: Summary of improvement on profits from no-rebate-case to current practice in sales-eﬀort
model∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Improvement percentage of R profit 0.12 0.12 29.5 −0.54 4.6
Improvement percentage of S profit 0.18 0.66 −64.32 3.93 −4.55
Improvement opercentage of SC profit 0.14 0.32 1.01 1.36 0.33
Improvement percentage of q 0.44 0.88 3.8 3.47 0.71
∗Each company has the same improvement percentage of R, S, and SC profits and q with small, medium, and large demand.
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Table 15: Summary of improvement on profits from current practice to SCC in sales-eﬀort model∗.
Companies
MRS MH RX SS LS
Improvement percentage of R profit 0.36 0.68 −22.48 1.53 3.03
Improvement percentage of S profit 9.07 11.43 203.2 7.84 20.18
Improvement opercentage of SC profit 3.14 4.7 1.72 4.27 7.27
Improvement percentage of q 21.9 27.58 16.95 24.86 36.68
∗Each company has the same improvement percentage of R, S, and SC profits and q with small, medium, and large demand.
3.3. Profit Variance (PV)
In this subsection, the PVs of the retailers, the manufacturers and the supply chains are
examined notice that profit variance PV  squared “standard deviation of profit SDP”.
Moreover, the PVs under the no-sales-eﬀort model and the sales-eﬀort model are also
compared. Notice that the manufacturer is risk free under the no rebate case because the
manufacturer’s profit is deterministic the supply chain is a make-to-order type. In specific,
the manufacturer simply gains from the retailer’s order quantity and does not bear any risk
coming from demand uncertainty, and the retailer takes up all the demand uncertainty risk
under the no rebate case. On the other hand, the manufacturer would bear some of the
demand uncertainty risk when the sales rebate contract is adopted. To be specific, as the
rebate payment from the manufacturer to the retailer depends on the realized demand, the
manufacturer’s final profit becomes stochastic and retail demand dependent.
Tables 5 and 6 show that for the five companies under investigation VΠR for SCC >
VΠR for current practices > VΠR for no rebate and VΠM for SCC > VΠM for current
practices > VΠM for no rebate. Therefore, all companies face the highest level of risk under
SCC, and all companies would face the smallest risk under the no rebate case, for both the
no-sales-eﬀort model and the sales-eﬀort model.
3.4. Decision Making under MV Approach
3.4.1. Linear Rebate Practitioners
In our analysis, both RX and LS are the practitioners of linear rebate. In our discussions above,
it has been shown that the retailers prefer the current linear practices to SCC due to the
higher expected profits. Conversely, the manufacturers would suﬀer losses from adopting
the current linear rebate practices. Table 7 summarizes the expected profits and the profit
variances of RX and LS. The following results are observed. For the retailers EΠR for current
practice > EΠR for SCC > EΠR for no rebate and VΠR for SCC > VΠR for current
practices >VΠR for no rebate. For themanufacturers, EΠM for SCC > EΠM for no rebate
> EΠM for current practices and VΠM for SCC > VΠM for current practices > VΠM for
no rebate. We note that the results are the same under both the no-sales-eﬀort model and the
sales-eﬀort model.
For the retailers RX and LS, a the current linear rebate practices are better than SCC
due to higher expected profits and smaller risks, b although the no rebate case brings the
lowest expected profits for the retailers, the lowest risks could be found simultaneously.
Therefore, the current linear rebate practices and the no rebate case are noninferior in the MV
sense, and SCC is inferior to the current practices and the no rebate case for these two retailers.
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For the manufacturers of RX and LS, a the current practices are dominated by the
no rebate case because the manufacturers could have higher expected profits but lower risks
under the no rebate case. b If the manufacturers attain SCC, the highest expected profits and
highest risks could be found. Therefore, SCC and the no rebate case are non-inferior for the
manufacturers of RX and LS in the MV sense. In other words, under the MV approach, the
manufacturers should only consider the no rebate case and SCC, and do not select the current
practices. There is obviously a diﬀerence between the optimal decisions for themanufacturers
and the retailers in the supply chains of RX and LS.
3.4.2. Target Sales Rebate Practitioners
MRS,MH, and SS adopt the target sales rebate policy. Table 8 summarizes the expected profits
and the profit variances of MRS, MH and SS. The following results are observed. For retailers,
EΠR for SCC > EΠR for current practices > EΠR for no rebate andVΠR for SCC >VΠR
for current practices > VΠR for no rebate. For manufacturers, EΠM for SCC > EΠM for
current practices > EΠM for no rebate and VΠM for SCC > VΠM for current practices
> VΠM for no rebate. We note that these results are consistently the same under both the
no-sales-eﬀort model and the sales-eﬀort model. The above result reveals that SCC, the no
rebate case, and the current practices are noninferior, respectively, for the manufacturers and
the retailers. In other words, under the MV approach, the manufacturers and the retailers can
choose among the no rebate case, the current practices, and SCC, depending on their own
tolerance levels of risk. Moreover, as SCC yields the highest levels of risk and the no rebate
case yields the lowest risk, SCC is the most risky and the no rebate case is the least risky for
both the manufacturers and the retailers.
4. Conclusions
Sales rebate contract is a kind of instrument to help to achieve supply chain coordination
SCC. It is commonly adopted in the fashion industry. In this paper, we study the
performance of sales rebate contracts in fashion supply chains with the use of real empirical
data from five companies. In our analysis, we find that SCC is significant to both the retailer
and the manufacturer. One interesting point to note is that the risk levels for attaining
coordination are also higher for both the retailer and the manufacturer since their respective
profit variances under SCC are also larger. The optimal parameters of the sales rebate
contracts should hence be determined with a good balance between the benefit expected
profit and the risk variance of profit. The supply chain agents should discuss and examine
the best contract setting which can achieve the best supply chain performance as well as
their own goals with respect to both benefit and risk perspectives. In the no rebate case, the
expected profits and risk levels are the lowest. We also find that an inappropriate setting of
sales rebate could either hurt the retailer or the manufacturer because the expected profit
of the retailer or the expected profit of the manufacturer may decrease with improperly
designed sales rebate contracts when compared with their expected profits in the no rebate
case. In this situation, sales rebate becomes a trap for either the retailer or the manufacturer.
By employing sales eﬀort, higher expected profits and lower risks for the retailers and
the manufacturers can be found. From our findings, we argue that how to set an optimal
rebate rate and contract format for the retailers to exert sales eﬀort under coordination is an
important decision for the manufacturers. In particular, our analysis reveals that the linear
18 Mathematical Problems in Engineering
rebate practices adopted by some companies will lead the retailers to avoid exerting sales
eﬀort. This gives a very important hint on real-world implementation of the sales rebate
contracts because the linear rebate practice has the drawback of hindering the level of sales
eﬀort exerted by the retailers.
The above findings are indicative for fashion supply chains as they provide important
insights and better pictures on the performance of sales rebate contracts. For future research,
more forms of rebates, such as consumer rebate, could be investigated as they are also
popular. By doing so, a more complete picture of how rebate contracts aﬀect fashion supply
chains can be revealed.
Appendix
For more details see Tables 9–15.
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